Emergent Concepts OF Military Operations Research
Some operational concepts are emergent. These concepts develop not in anticipation of future problems, but as responses to challenges that arise during a conflict.
An example occurred most recently in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan with the emergence of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. The doctrine was not new; rather, it was a rediscovery of previously accepted principles. Both the Army and Marine Corps already had a substantial number of official publications addressing guerrilla warfare and insurgencies. In any case, do research a cause and effect essay on Military Operations Research.
but that doctrine had all but faded from institutional memory, partly because of the residual influence of AirLand Battle and partly because of the enthusiasm with which the Office of the Secretary of Defense pushed its technology-based transformation program in the 1990s. It thus had to be rediscovered and updated.
When enemy fighters shifted to insurgent techniques, therefore, many Coalition formations had to adapt without the benefit of either explicit or tacit operational concepts. Nonetheless, some American units were employing counterinsurgency techniques by 2004 and 2005, well before official U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine appeared. The essay format on essays on Military Operations Research should reliably be accurate.
Several scholars described this adaptation as a revolution from the top down, while others portrayed it as coming from the “bottom-up.”
In truth, it was neither. The emergence of counterinsurgency techniques came into play more or less from a “sideways” direction, or laterally, through mid-level officers and noncommissioned officers who exercised reach-back capabilities and consulted with civilian experts and with each other to exchange information and share knowledge about what worked and what did not. Many counterinsurgency principles and practices (as well as healthy criticism of them) emerged through sheer trial and error and through the common sense (or experienced judgment) of brigade and battalion commanders.
Official U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, when it did appear, helped to codify and standardize—that is, render explicit—many of the procedures that were already in play, albeit unevenly and perhaps even poorly in some cases, and augmented them with others. It also situated such practices within a generic scheme of maneuver, which in turn rationalized them. The various stances in the counterinsurgency debate are well known and need not be addressed here. Writing an rhetorical analysis essay on Military Operations Research is an ideal idea.
The U.S. military’s rediscovery of counterinsurgency techniques was part of the process of adaptation that occurs relentlessly in wartime. Adaptation is simply how we cope with a situation or an adversary; in contrast, innovation is how we overcome one or the other—or, in some instances, both.
Conclusion
As we have seen, operational concepts are integral to military strength. They help to convert potential military strength into military power, an unquestionably essential function. However, they also have significant downsides. In part, these downsides stem from the processes by which operational concepts are developed. As JP-1 revealed, operational concepts are to be developed in a manner that affords a maximum amount of intellectual creativity. Paradoxically, this approach is also what makes operational concepts—whether AirLand Battle, Effects-Based Operations, Air-Sea Battle, or counterinsurgency doctrine—vulnerable. You can aslo read many other demonstration speech ideas on Military Operations Research.